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WHY LEGALIZED INSIDER TRADING WOULD BE A DISASTER 
BY GEORGE W. DENT, JR.* 
ABSTRACT 
Although insider trading is illegal, a stubborn minority still 
defends it as an efficient means of compensating executives and spurring 
innovation.  However, this minority assumes that legal insider trading 
would be constrained by the personal wealth of the insiders so that the 
scope of insider trading would rarely or never be so large as to cause 
outsiders to stop trading in affected stocks.  This Note argues that there 
would be no such constraint because insiders could obtain outside 
financing to fully exploit their informational advantage.  Outsiders would 
flee the public stock markets, which would drastically shrink or 
disappear.  The prospect of huge trading profits would induce managers 
to change many decisions, often to the detriment of the firm, in ways that 
would be virtually impossible for corporate monitors to detect.  
Accordingly, the case of legalizing insider trading is insupportable. 
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Although insider trading is illegal and widely condemned, a 
stubborn minority still defends it as an efficient method of compensating 
executives and spurring innovation.1  However, these defenses crucially 
assume that the wealth of individual insiders constrains the scope of 
insider trading.2  Accordingly, this minority argues that the abnormal 
profits realized by inside traders, at the expense of outsiders, are rarely or 
never large enough to cause outsiders to flee the affected stock.3  
Similarly, the potential gains from insider trading are rarely, if ever, big 
enough to corrupt the managers' business conduct.4  Thus, insider trading 
generates benefits for stockholders that exceed its immediate losses.5 
This Note opines that, if insider trading were allowed, it would not 
be constrained by insiders' wealth, because insiders could obtain enough 
outside financing to fully exploit their informational advantage.  In so 
doing, insiders would inevitably "muscle out" public investors.6  Stock 
markets would drastically shrink, if not disappear.7  The prospect of huge 
trading profits would tempt managers to alter many decisions, causing 
damage to the firm in ways that would be virtually impossible for 
corporate monitors to detect.8  The resulting damage to public 
shareholders would far exceed any benefits from insider trading.9  
Accordingly, the case for insider trading is insupportable.10 
 
                                                                                                             
1A number of state courts continue to hold that insider trading breaches no 
fiduciary duty. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 572 n.58 
(2002); see also HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 172-73, 178 
(1966) (categorizing the perceived danger posed by insider trading as generally exaggerated 
and noting how businesses may actually benefit from the use of inside information by 
government officials); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider 
Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 860 (1983) (arguing that insider trading is, in many markets, 
irregularly enforced, and that the law, in promoting enforcement, ignores the economic 
realities of insider trading); Darren T. Roulstone, The Relation Between Insider-Trading 
Restrictions and Executive Compensation, 41 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 525, 549 (2003) ("[I]nsider 
trading rewards and motivates executives.").   
2See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 591 ("[T]he insider's compensation is limited by 
the number of shares he can purchase. This, in turn, is limited by his wealth."); see also 
MANNE, supra note 1, at 173 (discussing the parameters of inside information usage by 
government employees). 
3See infra Part II (describing how insider trading, due to the fact that it is illegal, does 
not involve utilization of loaned funds). 
4See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 873-76 (arguing that critics of insider trading 
exaggerate its supposedly perverse incentives). 
5See infra Part I (summarizing the general arguments made by those who support 
insider trading). 
6See infra Part II.  
7See infra Part II. 
8See infra Part III.  
9See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 598 ("In short, the federal insider trading 
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I.  THE CASE FOR INSIDER TRADING 
Proponents of insider trading cite its ability to generate substantial 
benefits without causing substantial damage.11  The primary alleged 
benefit is that, in some situations, insider trading profits are the best way 
to compensate executives and induce innovation.12  Henry Manne 
initiated this argument.13 
[A]n entrepreneur's contribution to the firm consists of 
producing new valuable information.  The entrepreneur's 
compensation must have a reasonable relation to the value 
of his contribution to give him incentives to produce more 
information.  Because it is rarely possible to ascertain 
information's value to the firm in advance, predetermined 
compensation, such as salary, is inappropriate for 
entrepreneurs.  Instead, claimed Manne, insider trading is an 
effective way to compensate entrepreneurs for innovations.14 
This is not what happens now.15  Today, employees who have not 
created the valuable information conduct most insider trading.16  The use 
of insider trading as a reward for innovation would require each public 
company to designate who would be allowed to make such trades, and 
                                                                                                             
prohibition is justifiable solely as a means of protecting rights in information."). 
10See infra Part VI. 
11MANNE, supra note 1, at 154-56 (describing variables that influence the market, 
irrespective of whether trades are executed via inside knowledge).  
12See id. at 155 ("Therefore, the additional compensation provided by insider trading 
[to executives]…also benefits the corporation."). 
13See id. at 155. 
14BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 590.  See also id. at 604 ("The only plausible 
justification . . . is the argument that legalized insider trading would be an appropriate 
compensation scheme."). 
15See Robert A. Prentice & Dain C. Donelson, Insider Trading as a Signaling Device, 
47 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 4 (2010) (describing how the promotion of insider trading is a problematic 
idea and therefore policy choice).  
16See id.; SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941, 944 (S.D. Ohio 2004); SEC v. 
Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 761-63 (W.D. Okla. 1984); see also John P. Anderson, Greed, 
Envy, and the Criminalization of Insider Trading 30 (Miss. Coll. Sch. of Law Research, Paper 
No. 2012-03, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148688 
("[Some trade on inside information is acquired] by shear [sic] luck or by eavesdropping on 
the conversation of insiders.").  
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when they could occur, to monitor compliance.17  This raises huge 
logistical problems.18  
The second supposed benefit of insider trading is that it enhances 
the accuracy of prices in the stock market.19  Even if this were true, it is 
doubtful that it generates much benefit.20  Even in the absence of insider 
trading, the market for frequently traded securities is already quite 
efficient.21  Any benefit from the additional accuracy caused by insider 
trading would probably be trivial.22  More important, insider trading also 
impairs the functioning of securities markets.23  
As for the alleged detriments of insider trading, its defenders claim 
that its scope is constrained by the wealth of individual insiders.24  
Accordingly, although the abnormal profits realized by inside traders 
must (at the moment) come at the expense of outsiders, the cost to the 
latter will be small enough that outsiders will not abandon trading in the 
firm's stock.25  Edward Herman—pointing to the widespread public stock 
ownership and active trading in the 1920s, when insider trading was not 
 
                                                                                                             
17See Prentice & Donelson, supra note 15, at 4-5 (citations omitted) ("[I]nsider trading 
cannot be limited to the employee who created the information.").  
18See infra Part V. 
19See WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 19 (3d ed. 
2010) ("Increased accuracy of securities prices may also improve capital allocation . . . [and] 
may enhance the efficiency of the market by moving prices in the correct direction."). 
20The supposed benefit of accurate securities prices is that they help to direct capital to 
the most profitable uses; however, "[r]esource allocation is not directly affected by trades of 
existing securities."  WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 23.  
21See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 115 ("The [efficient capital markets hypothesis] is 
widely regarded as one of the most well-established propositions in the social sciences."); 
BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 246 (9th ed. 2007) ("Above 
all, [many economists] believe that financial markets are efficient because they don't allow 
investors to earn above-average returns without accepting above average risks."); Ronald J. 
Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 
549-53 (1984) (speculating about the various reasons for market efficiency). 
22MALKIEL, supra note 21, at 246 (describing numerous factors, not including insider 
trading, to which economists attribute market efficiency). 
23See infra Part IV. 
24See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
25See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 594 n.23 ("[A]ny gains siphoned off by insiders 
with respect to a particular stock are likely to be an immaterial percentage of the gains 
contemporaneously earned by the class of investors as a whole."); see also id. at 596 ("In the 
absence of a credible investor injury story, it is difficult to see why insider trading should 
undermine investor confidence in the integrity of the securities markets."); Anderson, supra 
note 16, at 7 ("[M]ost economists now agree that the direct impact of insider trading on 
counterparties is either non-existent or indeterminable."); Robert E. Wagner, Gordon Gekko to 
the Rescue? Insider Trading as a Tool to Combat Accounting Fraud, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 973, 
998-1005 (2011) (arguing that legalized insider trading would not undermine investors' 
willingness to trade in the stock markets). 
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clearly illegal—argues that insider trading would not deter outsider 
trading.26  Stock markets, however, have changed since the 1920s.27  
More important, even in the 1920s the legality of insider trading 
was far from clear.28  The so-called "majority rule" allowed insider 
trading.29  However, this rule was subject to an exception whenever 
"special facts" existed.30  "Since there was no meaningful way to 
differentiate those cases that involved 'special facts' from those that 
didn't, the special-facts exception either ate up the majority rule or made 
the rule impossible to administer in a consistent fashion."31  Clearly, 
legalizing insider trading would be very different, and have very 
different consequences.32  
II.  THE EFFECT OF OUTSIDE FINANCING ON INSIDER TRADING 
If insider trading were simply permitted without any restriction, 
insiders would be free to seek outside financing for their trading.33  The 
incentive for them to do so is obvious.34  Outsiders already borrow 
 
                                                                                                             
26Edward S. Herman, Equity Funding, Inside Information, and the Regulators, 21 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 17 (1973) ("Perhaps this form of fraud is not regarded seriously because the 
market is so full of arbitrary advantage . . . [and] privilege.").  In a similar vein, Stephen 
Bainbridge says: "The loss of confidence argument is further undercut by the stock market's 
performance since the insider trading scandals of the mid-1980s.  The enormous publicity 
given those scandals put all investors on notice that insider trading is a common securities 
violation."  BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 596. 
However, Congress then strengthened the laws against insider trading and the SEC 
stepped up enforcement actions against inside traders. See Insider Trading and Securities 
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) ("[N]onetheless, 
additional methods are appropriate to deter and prosecute violations of such rules and 
regulations."); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 
(1984) (increasing, inter alia, the penalties associated with insider trading).  This may have 
reassured investors that insider trading would be substantially mitigated.  Moreover, these 
scandals occurred at the beginning of a prolonged economic expansion, which probably 
overwhelmed any increased investor concerns about insider trading. 
27See infra Part IV. 
28See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIAL 943 (10th ed. 2011).  
29Id. 
30Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 433 (1909) (analyzing the facts of the transactions in 
question with the goal of determining legality). 
31EISENBERG & COX, supra note 28, at 946. 
32See infra Part IV. 
33See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.9[1], at 794 
(4th ed. 2002) ("A large number of securities transactions, especially those by speculative 
investors, are entered into by the broker extending credit to the purchaser."). 
34Id. 
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money for stock trading "on margin," so, logically, insiders could borrow 
in a similar fashion.35   
Indeed, insiders would have both the will and the means to borrow 
much more heavily than outsiders.36  In an efficient securities market, 
few outsiders, if any, can consistently beat the market.37  Even if a 
handful of outsiders can regularly outperform the market, lenders cannot 
easily identify them.38  Accordingly, lenders must treat borrowers as 
"noise" traders who assume all the risks of the market's volatility.39  To 
insulate themselves from these risks, lenders must limit the loans they 
make, and either monitor the borrower's performance to make a margin 
call when the value of the borrower's securities falls near the amount of 
the loan, or demand security from a pledge of other assets owned by the 
borrower.40  
Insiders, however, can consistently beat the market; they already 
do.41  Since their trading is less risky than outsider trading, lenders would 
 
                                                                                                             
35See HAZEN, supra note 33, at 794 ("[Purchasing] 'on margin' [is where] the broker 
advanc[es] part of the purchase price to the customer.").  
36See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 19 (describing the limitations insider 
trading laws place on resource allocation to such traders).  
37See id. at 26 ("[E]ven the most sophisticated institutions have difficulty 
outperforming the stock market averages."); STEPHEN A. ROSS, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD 
& JEFFREY F. JAFFE, CORPORATE FINANCE 353 (6th ed. 2006), quoted in ROBERTA ROMANO, 
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 63 (2d ed. 2010) ("The overwhelming evidence . . . is that 
mutual funds, on average, do not beat broad-based indices."). 
38See MALKIEL, supra note 21, at 246 ("$100 bills are not lying around for the taking, 
either by the professional or the amateur investor."). 
39Noise Trader Definition, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/ 
noisetrader.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) ("[Noise Trader is] [t]he term used to describe an 
investor who makes decisions regarding buy and sell trades without the use of fundamental 
data.  These investors generally have poor timing, follow trends, and over-react to good and 
bad news."). 
40See HAZEN, supra note 33, § 14.9[1], at 795-97 (explaining margin maintenance and 
margin calls). 
41See Joseph E. Finnerty, Insiders and Market Efficiency, 31 J. FIN. 1141, 1148 (1992) 
(noting that even critics agree that insiders are capable of outperforming the market); Dan 
Givoly & Dan Palmon, Insider Trading and the Exploitation of Inside Information: Some 
Empirical Evidence, 58 J. BUS. 69, 76 (1985) (noting that insiders generate impressive and 
abnormal results); Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Special Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. BUS. 410, 
424 (1974) (explaining the results of a study finding that insiders realize significant abnormal 
returns); Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, Executives' Good Luck in Trading Own Stock, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 28, 2012, at 1 (explaining that statistics show that executives who trade irregularly 
perform better in the market than those who trade in an annual pattern). 
Of course, insiders can make mistakes.  They might, for instance, overestimate the 
market's reaction to some development and by their trading push the price farther than the 
market deems appropriate after the development is disclosed.  However, insiders are better 
positioned than outsiders to evaluate new information, and they can be cautious in their 
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be willing to lend them more money.42  Furthermore, because their 
trading poses little risk, insiders would be more willing to give personal 
assets (like their homes) as collateral to secure loans than would prudent 
outsiders.43  As a result, borrowing could greatly multiply the trading 
capacity of insiders.44  
Alternatively, an insider could also obtain equity financing by 
forming a company ("insider trading equity fund" or "ITEF") to 
implement her trades and inviting investors to buy stock in her fund.  
Although it is theoretically possible for outside investors to get equity 
financing,45 it would generally be foolish for others to provide such 
financing because few, if any, outsiders can consistently beat the 
market.46  Any investor can guess, so giving money to another investor 
who is also guessing does not generate better returns.47  Mutual funds 
offer investors an easy way to obtain and maintain diversification, and 
they handle the paperwork that investors would otherwise have to do 
themselves,48 but they do not outperform the market.49   
Since insiders will often outperform the market, they could offer 
investors better returns than are otherwise available to them.50  As such, 
insiders should be able to raise as much equity financing as they could 
profitably deploy, but in reality such equity financing is unnecessary.  
Entrepreneurs typically issue equity only when an investment is risky;51 
                                                                                                             
trading, so such mistakes should be rare.  See Roland Benabou & Guy Laroque, Using 
Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility, 107 Q.J. 
ECON. 921, 924 (1992). 
42See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 1, at 60 (noting that there is less uncertainty and risk 
associated with insider trading because when insiders purchase shares, the value of all shares 
rise). 
43Id. 
44To secure loans ready when needed, insiders could arrange lines of credit in advance 
with lenders.  Insiders could also trade on options, which are much cheaper than the 
underlying stock, thereby further leveraging their trading capacity.  See EISENBERG & COX, 
supra note 28, at 777. 
45See Mark A. Allebach, Small Business, Equity Financing, and the Internet: The 
Evolution of a Solution?, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 21-31 (1999) (describing desirable conditions 
to obtain equity financing without explicitly excluding outside investors). 
46See MALKIEL, supra note 21, at 210 ("[A]ll investors . . . are risk-averse."); supra 
note 36 and accompanying text. 
47See MALKIEL, supra note 21, at 204 ("Your guess is as good as that of the ape, your 
stockbroker, or even mine."). 
48Id. at 372 ("In addition to offering risk reduction through diversification, the mutual 
funds provide freedom from having to select stocks, and relief from paperwork and record-
keeping for tax purposes."). 
49See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
50See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
51See, e.g., Hunter C. Blum, ESOP's Fables: Leveraged ESOPs and Their Effect on 
Managerial Slack, Employee Risk and Motivation in the Public Corporation, 31 U. RICH. L. 
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debt is preferred for safer investments because it is cheaper.52  Because 
insiders take little risk,53 they arguably would be able to raise most or all 
the capital they can profitably use by borrowing.54 
Does this projection underestimate the risks insiders may incur?  
The efficiency and rationality of stock markets have been questioned.55  
Limits to arbitrage may restrict the ability of traders to correct 
mispricing, so bubbles may persist.56  The activity of uninformed (or 
"noise") traders may not be random and independent but may be herd-
like behavior.57  More generally, it is unclear how "rational" (or 
fundamental value efficient) stock markets are.58  
It is hard to see, however, how these market defects pose much 
risk to inside traders, who typically trade on the basis of information that 
is expected to be publicly disclosed shortly after being attained by these 
inside traders.59  Regardless of the possible market flaws just listed, it is 
widely accepted that markets react quickly—and appropriately—to the 
                                                                                                             
REV. 1539, 1545 (1997) ("[S]hareholders seek higher returns from equity than debt because 
their risk levels are higher."). 
52See WILLIAM R. LASHER, PRACTICAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 560 
(2011) ("Generally the return on an equity investment is higher than the return on debt or 
preferred because the risk is higher.  Hence, the firm's cost of equity capital is higher than its 
cost of debt or preferred stock.  The return/cost of debt tends to be the lowest of the three, 
because debt is the least risky investment.").  
53See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
54To the extent that equity funding was desirable, the funds would probably be private, 
because public offerings of stock are much more costly than private placements, and public 
investment companies are subject to extensive regulation.  See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 
87 ("[A] registered public offering is a very expensive proposition . . . [and] public offering 
easily can take months to complete.").  
55See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF 
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 138-39 (2d ed. 1995) (presenting evidence that stock markets are 
not fundamentally value efficient). 
56See ROMANO, supra note 37, at 63-64 (explaining that limits to arbitrage may make 
it difficult to correct mispricing); see also MALKIEL, supra note 21, at 234, as reprinted in 
ROMANO, supra note 37, at 79-80 ("Arbitrageurs . . . are expected to take offsetting 
positions . . . so that any mispricing caused by irrational investors is quickly corrected."). 
57See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral 
Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023 (2000) (explaining that herd behavior is not random and 
occurs when an uninformed actor chooses to follow the decisions of a presumably better 
informed person).  
58See ROMANO, supra note 37, at 85 ("[W]hether stocks are correctly valued  . . . is 
impossible to measure."); see also GILSON & BLACK, supra note 55, at 138-39 (presenting 
evidence that stock markets are not fundamentally value efficient). 
59Trading on the belief that a bubble exists would entail greater risks.  However, 
insiders seem not to trade (at least not aggressively) on such beliefs.  There is no evidence that 
insiders massively bailed out (much less made extensive short sales) during the high tech and 
housing market bubbles.  See Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets 
Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 494 (2006) (discussing concerns pursuant to 
trading when bubbles exist).    
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release of news.60  Theoretically, an insider buying (or selling) a stock 
based on non-public (either good or bad) news could get burned if a herd 
of irrational noise traders happened to send the stock's price down (or 
up), despite disclosure of the good (or bad) news.61  Such incidents, 
however, must be extremely rare; I have not noticed reference to any 
such cases in the voluminous literature on insider trading.  At most, 
market irrationality might somewhat limit the ability of insiders to 
borrow for trading, thus forcing them to raise a little more outside 
equity.62  
Alternatively, insiders could sell their information.63  An 
investment company could create a public "Tippee Trading Fund," and 
pay insiders for information on which the fund would then trade.64  This 
would save insiders the time and expense of trading through their own 
accounts.65  
Could this situation be avoided by allowing insider trading, but 
limiting it to the insider's personal funds?66  Minimally, such a limitation 
would radically change the standards for executive hiring and retention.  
A more wealthy person could reap larger returns from insider trading 
than an individual with less personal capital, and therefore would need 
fewer alternate forms of compensation.67  Indeed, some wealthy 
individuals might offer to pay a company for the privilege to engage in 
 
                                                                                                             
60See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 114 (explaining that professional investors react to 
new information by trading, and this moves stock prices in response to the change of 
information). 
61See, e.g., Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk and 
Staged Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1286 (2012) ("Noise trading increases . . . the 
risk that informed traders will lose money on arbitrage transactions."). 
62See Margaret Bogenrief, A Tale of Two Lending Markets, J. CORP. RENEWAL, Apr. 
20, 2011 (asserting that lending institutions are most interested in lending to profitable 
companies with the least amount of risk). 
63See Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 
VA. L. REV. 1023, 1052 (1990) (addressing the possibility of an insider selling his inside 
information). 
64See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 564 (discussing circumstances under which the 
court will not find the tippee liable). 
65Roberta Romano provocatively asks:  "Could insiders profit by becoming market 
makers themselves and offering a lower spread?"  ROMANO, supra note 37, at 665.  
Without taking that step insiders could still contract to tip market makers, whose 
positions may enable them to exploit inside information more cheaply than anyone else can.  
See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
66See Benjamin Alaire, Dividend Entitlements and Intermediate Default Rules, 9 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 135, 170 (2004) (describing circumstances under which insiders could 
use personal funds to trade on nonpublic material). 
67Id. at 170-71 (discussing the potential for insiders to earn virtually unlimited returns 
with enough funding).  
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insider trading of its stock.68  An individual's managerial ability would 
still be a crucial factor, but among several talented managerial 
candidates, the lower salary demands of wealthier executives could be 
decisive.69  
The fairness of such a limitation would be questionable, as it 
would allow wealthier executives to reap greater profits than the less 
wealthy.70  Such a limitation would also be challenging to enforce and 
even to define.71  Trading on public markets is at least observable, but 
private financing is not.72  How would the SEC or anyone else know 
whether an insider had borrowed money (e.g., from a friend or relative) 
with which to trade?  How could one say whether an insider was using a 
home mortgage loan for purposes of insider trading?  Insiders could also 
easily avoid the personal-wealth limitation by selling their inside 
information to tippees unless that behavior was also forbidden.73  
To avoid these problems, the law could simply limit the amount of 
insider trading.  Establishing and enforcing appropriate limits, however, 
would be difficult.74  Even limited opportunities for insider trading would 
affect managerial conduct, as discussed in the next section.75  Moreover, 
it is unnecessary to incur these problems because any beneficial 
incentives created by allowing limited insider trading can be better 
achieved through other forms of incentive compensation.76  
 
                                                                                                             
68Id. (noting the advantage that insiders have in the market over outsiders, attributable 
to their possession of nonpublic information).  
69See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
70Id. 
71See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing 
the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 449 (2001) (discussing 
means by which insiders could evade limitations on insider trading). 
72See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 868 (explaining that insider trading is 
observable on the market).  
73See Krawiec, supra note 71, at 499 ("Many insiders will . . . evade the . . . limitations 
on insider trading by trading through or tipping friends and family members."). 
74Inter alia, it would be difficult to choose the criteria for the permitted amount of 
insider trading for each company.  How would the amounts be set for each officer?  For 
instance, what would be the optimal level of permissible insider trading by directors?  Would 
insider trading allowances be tradable?  See id. at 448. 
75See infra Part III. 
76See Kristoffel R. Grechenig, The Marginal Incentive of Insider Trading: An 
Economic Reinterpretation of the Case Law, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 75, 123 (2006) (discussing 
compensation packages that are not based on insider trading). 
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III.  THE IMPACT OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADING ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
Prior commentators have noted that the temptation of insider 
trading could drastically alter an executive's management 
decisions.77  This is most obvious with respect to disclosure.78  Consider a 
CEO who has just received some good news and some bad news, the two 
of equal significance.  She could disclose both simultaneously, and the 
company's stock price would not move.  There would be then no 
occasion for insider trading.  
Alternatively, she could disclose the two items separately.  She 
could first sell some stock (and/or make short sales), then disclose the 
bad news.  After the stock's price falls in response, she would buy stock 
at the lower price.  She would then release the good news and profit 
when the stock price reacts by rising.  Of course, her gains would be 
matched by the losses of outsiders, who would have lost nothing if both 
news items had been revealed simultaneously.  
Other effects on management are less obvious, but more serious.  
For example, each insider would have an incentive to withhold 
information from colleagues and the board of directors until she could 
fully exploit the insider trading potential of that information.79  Such 
behavior could impair management's ability to make good decisions.80  
 Insiders would also have an incentive to release false or 
misleading information to take advantage of the duped outsiders by 
trading against them.81  Releasing materially false or misleading 
statements violates federal securities laws, and presumably would 
continue to do so after the legalization of insider trading,82 but liability 
 
                                                                                                             
77See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 599-600 (describing the incentive of 
withholding information that insiders would realize, if insider trading were permitted). 
78Id. 
79See id. (discussing how permissive insider trading would promote deliberate 
withholding of information); Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the 
Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1054-56 (1982) (explaining 
various scenarios in which the employee might be tempted to withhold information from the 
rest of the company). 
80See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
81Haft, supra note 79, at 1055 ("[P]rofit-maximizing insiders, before transmitting 
information upward, might attempt to arrange loans to purchase or sell a greater amount of 
stock than their available resources would otherwise permit.  Insiders might also convey the 
information to select corporate outsiders to whom they owe favors or from whom they expect 
future benefits."). 
82See, e.g., Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2296, 
2299 (2011) (opining over whether a mutual fund investment advisor was liable for a 10b-5 
 
258 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 38 
for this behavior has many conditions, and violations are often hard to 
prove.83  Currently, occasions when insiders can benefit personally from 
issuing false statements are relatively rare because trading on inside 
information is illegal.84  By greatly increasing the frequency of such 
occasions, the legalization of insider trading would substantially increase 
the dissemination of false or misleading information.85  
Officers would also have an incentive to run a company so as to 
increase the volatility of its stock by increasing risk, even if the steps 
taken diminish the company's value.86  There is little potential for insider 
trading profit in a stock that does not often rise or fall.87  A stock that is 
volatile has greater insider trading opportunities than in one that is 
stable.88  Indeed, managers could profit by short selling a company's 
stock, and then deliberately making bad decisions that cause its stock 
price to plummet.89  
                                                                                                             
violation, pursuant to the dissemination of false information). 
83See, e.g., id. at 2301-02 (recognizing, inter alia, liability under SEC rule 10b-5 is 
limited to the person who makes the public statement; it does not extend to one who provided 
false information to the speaker); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976) 
(finding the plaintiff must prove that the speaker was not merely negligent but knew that the 
statement was false). 
84See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.  Thus, an insider who traded after the release of 
materially false information would violate the securities laws if she knew the information was 
false or had any other material nonpublic information, even if she did not make the false 
statement. 
85See Frank Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and 
the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 336 (1981) ("It is not possible for the 
firm's stock to trade at the optimal level while the firm keeps its information hidden; better for 
the firm to release the information itself at the appropriate time."). 
86See id. at 332; Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with 
Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 425 n.18 (2000) ("The prospect of insider 
trading profits can [,inter alia,] discourage managerial effort by enabling insiders to profit 
even if they generate bad news."). 
87See Saul Levmore, In Defense of the Regulation of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 101, 104-05 (1988) ("But if we assume for the sake of argument, as proponents of 
deregulation must, that insider trading is a stimulant that cannot be equaled by compensation 
tools that are currently legal, then it follows that insider trading is also dangerous, because the 
profit potential from a drop in security prices can motivate poor work or behavior by insiders 
that is disastrous to the interests of the firm."). 
88See Easterbrook, supra note 85, at 332 ("The opportunity to gain from insider trading 
also may induce managers to increase the volatility of the firm's stock prices.  They may select 
riskier projects than the shareholders would prefer, because if the risk pays off they can 
capture a portion of the gains in insider trading, and, if the project flops, the shareholders bear 
the loss."). 
89See Levmore, supra note 87, at 104-05 ("[A]n insider will actually cause a loss so 
that a price decrease that he can profit from will occur."). 
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The principal defense of insider trading is that it is an efficient 
form of executive compensation.90  All the foregoing considerations cast 
doubt on that defense.  
IV.  THE IMPACT OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADING ON STOCK MARKETS 
In most cases it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify specific 
victims of insider trading.91  It does not, however, follow that insider 
trading is benign.92  To analogize, offenses such as polluting the 
environment or failing to pay one's taxes have nameless victims, yet the 
existence of harm is clear; so it is with insider trading.93 
Even proponents of insider trading acknowledge that it causes 
greater disparities between bid and ask prices.94  Further, the SEC has 
said that "economic studies have provided support for the view that 
insider trading reduces liquidity, increases volatility, and may increase 
the cost of capital."95  Thus, insider trading impairs more than it enhances 
the efficient functioning of stock markets, even when it is illegal, and 
therefore not very common.96  
Scholars claim that widespread insider trading did not prevent 
rapid growth of the stock market in the 1920s.97  However, even at the 
time, insider trading was not clearly legal.98  Moreover, both stock 
ownership and trading are much greater now than they were in the 
1920s.99   
 
                                                                                                             
90See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 
91See supra note 25, infra note 176. 
92See Levmore, supra note 87, at 105 (describing various forms of malfeasance the 
spectre of insider trading can bring to a going concern). 
93Id. ("[D]eregulation threatens the economy with less information and with 
strategically bad behavior by insiders.  These arguments, and the evolution toward regulation 
of insider trading in so many legal systems, create a strong presumption that must be overcome 
by those who would deregulate.”). 
94See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 37 ("[S]pecialists and market-makers 
may be the victims of stock market insider trading (although they may sometimes pass the 
harm to others)."); Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical 
Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 144-45 (2004) 
(discussing the pros and cons of increased regulation on insider trading).  However, some 
studies show no correlation.  See id at 147-48. 
95Exchange Act Release No. 43154, 73 SEC Docket 3, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶¶ 86, 319 (Aug. 15, 2000). 
96Id. 
97See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
98See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
99See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 860 n.16 (describing historical international 
trends in insider trading regulation).  
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The ban on insider trading probably has something to do with 
this:100  Stock traders are more sophisticated now than in the 1920s.101  
Most traders then were individuals, many of whom were buying stock for 
the first time and knew little of the risks, including insider trading, until 
they were rudely educated by the 1929 stock market crash.102  Today, 
most trading is done by institutions that are keenly aware of such risks.103  
Furthermore, in the 1920s, no foreign stock markets barred insider 
trading, so investors had no better alternative than the American 
markets.104  Today, all developed countries ban insider trading.105  If 
America were to legalize insider trading, investors would simply go 
elsewhere.106  
Legalizing insider trading could effectively destroy public stock 
markets.107  Defenders of insider trading claim that it does not harm 
outsiders.108  Although it is virtually impossible to identify the victims of 
any particular act of insider trading, it is easy to see that it must hurt 
outside investors collectively.109   
Imagine two publicly traded companies with identical operations.  
In one there is some significant amount of insider trading; in the other 
there is none.  In the former, insiders siphon off some of the profits from 
the stock.  Accordingly, outsiders must value its stock lower than the 
stock of the latter company.110  Nonetheless, as long as the level of insider 
 
                                                                                                             
100 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, An Overview of Insider Trading Law and Policy: An 
Introduction to the Insider Trading Research Handbook 35-36 (UCLA School of Law, Law & 
Econs. Research, Paper No. 12-15 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141457 
(describing the expansion of trading volume in recent years). 
101 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 676 (1997) (discussing how the SEC 
passed Rule 14e-3(a) to prevent sophisticated traders from trading on the basis of material, 
nonpublic information, and then escaping responsibility due to lack of proof). 
102 See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 526 (1909) (describing fraud in a pre-
1929 market). 
103 See Bainbridge, supra note 100, at 14 (describing the development of Exchange 
Act §§ 16(b) and 10(b)). 
104 Id. at 21. 
105 See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
106 Id. 
107 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) ("Investors likely would 
hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading was based on misappropriated 
nonpublic information unchecked by law."). If that statement is true, it would seem also to 
apply a fortiori to trading by insiders of the issuer. 
108 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
109 See Wagner, supra note 25, at 999 ("[I]n the most recent insider trading Supreme 
Court case, United States v. O'Hagan, 'there is no mention of individual harm in specific 
transactions.  Rather, the focus is on the harm from a decrease in public confidence in the 
market.'"). 
110 See Morris Mendelson, The Mechanics of Insider Trading Reconsidered, 117 U. 
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trading stays low, the potential profits to outsiders are still high enough 
to attract them to purchase the stock at some price.111  
This all changes once insider trading is permitted, as it is hard to 
see how there could be any other trading.112  Insiders will trade whenever 
no higher returns are attainable from other investments (e.g., real 
estate).113  Imagine being asked to bid on a bag whose contents you do 
not know, but that are known to another bidder.  The informed bidder 
will raise her bid unless and until you bid more than the bag's fair value.  
No reasonable person would enter such a contest.114  
It is suggested that insider trading will not scare off outsiders 
because they "already disregard a large body of evidence indicating that 
even the most sophisticated institutions have difficulty outperforming the 
stock market averages. . . .  These investors may be convinced that 
certain stocks will make them money; the occurrence of insider trading 
may have little effect on investment so motivated."115  Not all 
"uninformed" traders, however, are so naive.116  Even investors familiar 
with the efficient market hypothesis buy and sell stock when they want to 
make additional investments, disinvest, or better diversify their 
portfolios.117  
As already noted, the public market in a stock can survive some 
level of insider trading.118  To compensate for the gains siphoned off by 
                                                                                                             
PA. L. REV. 470, 477-78 (1969) (book review) (discussing insider trading as a mechanism of 
relative devaluation); William K. S. Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading: Victims, Violators 
and Remedies-Including an Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of a Used Car with a Generic Defect, 
28 VILL. L. REV. 27, 29 (2000) (noting that if insiders make more profit, other investors must 
make less); see also Obeua S. Persons, SEC's Insider Trading Enforcements and Target Firms, 
39 J. BUS. RES. 187, 189 (July 1997) (asserting that an announcement of insider trading 
enforcement action by the SEC is associated with a price decrease in the affected stock).  
111 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 52-54 (describing how low volume 
securities may escape apparent damage from the presence of insider trading). 
112 See JASON KELLY, THE NEATEST LITTLE GUIDE TO STOCK MARKET INVESTING 2-
3 (2010) (emphasizing the importance of stock trading). 
113 Id. 
114See George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (explaining that such a situation is a variation 
on a market for lemons.  That is, uninformed outsider buyers must assume that the seller is an 
insider with undisclosed bad news and, accordingly, discount the price they are willing to pay.  
With the market price so depressed, insiders will not sell unless they do have undisclosed bad 
news.).  
115WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 26. 
116See Mendelson, supra note 110, at 475 (asserting that it is a fallacy to assume that 
only certain types of investors are risk-averse). 
117See Easterbrook, supra note 85, at 336 ("People invest in stock because they 
anticipate return."). 
118See Wagner, supra note 25, at 1001 ("[E]ven though the most widespread insider 
trading scandal in the history of Wall Street had just been revealed and was still being reported 
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insiders, the market will discount a stock's price to allow rational trading 
by outsiders.119  In an efficient market, uninformed investors cannot beat 
the market, but neither will they underperform other outsiders, "even the 
most sophisticated institutions."120  They will invest in stocks if the stock 
market outperforms other available investments.121  In the long run, it 
does.122 
If insider trading becomes rampant, however, the only trades left 
on the table for outsiders will be those that insiders have spurned because 
they offer a lower return than is available elsewhere.123  Not even the 
most sophisticated mutual fund could match the performance of even a 
minimally skilled insider.  In such a world only a fool would utilize 
anything but an insider trading equity fund to trade stock.124  
Not even through examining foreign experience can we adequately 
tell how stock markets would fare under legalized insider trading because 
"all countries with developed capital markets limit insider trading to 
some extent."125  However, the breadth and enforcement of the 
prohibitions vary, and stricter insider trading bans are associated with 
wider stock ownership, better stock price accuracy, and deeper market 
liquidity.126  The corporate cost of equity declines significantly when a 
country forbids insider trading and actually enforces the law.127  
                                                                                                             
on, the stock market value increased by almost 25%."). 
119Investors who trade in a futile effort to beat the market are still irrationally incurring 
the transaction costs of trading, but these are not very large. 
120WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 26. 
121See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 881 (arguing that even if this means that 
insider trading at low levels will not injure outsiders, it does not follow that low levels of 
insider trading are not inefficient).  
122See KELLY, supra note 112, at 2-3 (documenting that returns in the stock market 
have exceeded returns to other investments over the past 75 years). 
123See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 27 ("This delay would extend the period 
during which public traders incur beneficial windfalls or fortuitous losses."). 
124Curiously, some commentators acknowledge this fact but fail to draw the inevitable 
conclusions.  Bainbridge, supra note 100, at 35-36 ("When trading with insiders, the market 
maker or specialist . . . will always be on the wrong side of the transaction.").  However, he 
stops there, failing to realize that legalizing insider trading would therefore force even 
sophisticated players like specialists out of the stock markets, thereby devastating if not 
completely destroying them.  Rather, he treats the ban on insider trading as a form of rents for 
specialists and market professionals.  See id. at 35-37. 
125Bainbridge, supra note 100, at 21. 
126See Laura N. Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: An 
Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237, 
258-59, 261-62, 273-80 (2007) (highlighting the types of insider trading enforcement 
provisions that are found internationally). 
127See Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. 
FIN. 75, 104 (2002) ("[T]he establishment of insider trading laws–is not associated with a 
reduction in the cost of equity.  It is the difficult part–the enforcement of insider trading laws–
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Countries that more effectively bar insider trading have less volatile 
stock markets.128  So it is no surprise that whenever the SEC announces 
enforcement actions involving insider trading, the price of the affected 
stock declines.129  
All this evidence contradicts the market efficiency arguments for 
insider trading.  Although less of the pie remains for outsiders if more of 
it is taken by inside traders, outsiders might still be better off if insider 
trading spurs innovation, thereby causing the pie to expand.130  In that 
case however, companies in markets that allow insider trading should 
have a lower cost of capital, and revelations of possible insider trading in 
a company's stock should cause its stock price to rise.131  The evidence 
just discussed demonstrates that the opposite is true.  
Outsiders might be able to share in superior profits by investing in 
insider trading equity funds.  However, as already suggested, insiders 
will probably have little need to create such funds because they will be 
able to finance most or all of their trading with (cheaper) debt.132  Thus, 
everyone but insiders would abandon the stock market.133  
As an obvious consequence, public trading in stocks would 
essentially cease.134  Insiders can trade only if there are outsiders 
(including market makers)135 with whom to trade.  If outsiders pull out, 
                                                                                                             
that is associated with a reduction in the cost of equity in a country."); Robert A. Prentice, The 
Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 831 n.347 (2006) (asserting that this 
phenomenon conforms to theoretical predictions); see also Mendelson, supra note 110, at 477-
78 (positing that companies with insider trading would have a higher cost of capital than 
companies without it). 
128See Julan Du & Shang-Jin Wei, Does Insider Trading Raise Market Volatility?, 114 
ECON. J. 916, 940 (2004).  A recent study concludes that "more democratic political systems 
enacted and enforced insider trading laws earlier than less democratic or authoritarian political 
systems, controlling for wealth, financial development, legal origin, etc."  Laura N. Beny, The 
Political Economy of Insider Trading Laws and Enforcement: Law vs. Politics? International 
Evidence 44 (U. of Mich. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 08-001, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=304383. 
129See Persons, supra note 110, at 188-89 ("The negative effects of these SECs 
enforcement's [sic] can be attributable to noncompliance with the securities laws of target 
firms.  Because insider trading enforcement also involves the noncompliance with the 
securities laws, the enforcement is likely to have a negative effect on a target firm's stock 
value."). 
130See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 881 n.80 (arguing that permitting insider 
trading would expand the pie). 
131 Id. 
132See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
133See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 879 ("In order to induce trade [of stocks], 
something must prevent the uninformed from holding the 'market' and not trading."). 
134Id. 
135WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 67 n.84 ("[M]arket-makers are 
disproportionately harmed by insider trading [and, accordingly,] market-makers' bid-ask 
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there would be no stock market; there would be no publicly traded 
companies.136  
 It would not, however, be tenable to have all the equity of large 
firms owned by just a few insiders; that is why public ownership 
originally evolved.  If public ownership were destroyed by insider 
trading, large firms would have to seek investment from private equity 
companies.137  In most cases, private equity owners demand control.138  As 
part of that control, they also insist on full disclosure when executives 
buy or sell the firm's stock.139  In other words, they do not tolerate insider 
trading.  Thus, ironically, legalizing insider trading would lead to the 
extinction of public stock markets and of insider trading itself.  
Although unrestricted insider trading would destroy the stock 
markets and thus preclude insider trading, could market forces somehow 
react so as to prevent this destruction?  It is true that individual insiders 
would have no incentive to restrain their trading,140 but, as a response, 
individual companies could try to curb insider trading.141  
V.  CAN THE MARKET HANDLE INSIDER TRADING? 
Public stock ownership evolved because it is efficient in many 
situations.  The disappearance of public ownership posited in the 
preceding section would be inefficient, but markets tend to be efficient.142  
                                                                                                             
spreads are wider for firms with a great deal of insider trading.").  See also MANNE, supra note 
1, at 102 (arguing that frequent traders are more likely to be harmed by insider trading than 
long-term investors).  If insider trading were legalized and became widespread, market-
makers would probably have to cease doing business. 
136Is this fear exaggerated?  It has been pointed out that until recent legislation, 
government officials could trade on misappropriated nonpublic information, but this did not 
destroy the stock markets.  However, even before the recent legislation, the legality of such 
trading was unclear.  Compare Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Inside the Beltway, 36 
J. CORP. L. 281, 285 (2011) ("[C]ongressional staffers and other government officials and 
employees could be prosecuted successfully for insider trading under the federal securities 
laws, but the quirks of the relevant laws almost certainly would prevent members of Congress 
from being successfully prosecuted."), with Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional 
Officials, and Duties of Enforcement, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1142-43, 1147 (2011) (arguing to 
the contrary that politicians are also subject to political pressures against such behavior to 
which business executives are not exposed.  As a result, the level of such misappropriation 
trading by government officials has been too low to destroy the stock markets.). 
137See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
138See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
139See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
140See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
141See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 862-63 (stating that there has been little to 
no consideration regarding private regulation of insider trading). 
142See Beny, supra note 128, at 2 ("Despite theoretical arguments that stock markets 
are more efficient when insiders are allowed to trade freely, many increasingly regard insider 
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Why, then, could the market itself not preserve public ownership to the 
extent that it is efficient?  Insider trading apologists argue that 
corporations could have prohibited insider trading long ago, but they did 
not do so.143  These apologists infer that such a prohibition would be 
inefficient.144  
However, in the last thirty years, many corporations have adopted 
insider trading prohibitions.145  Moreover, prior to that time many 
corporations did not even expressly prohibit embezzlement.146  This does 
not mean these corporations condoned embezzlement.  Rather, they 
probably believed that any employee caught stealing would be fired and 
become unemployable, and that any further sanction would be imposed 
by public law.147  The same reasoning probably applied to insider 
trading.148  Although many firms in the past (and some still today) do not 
formally forbid insider trading, never did any firms in the past publicly 
condone insider trading, and none have sought exemptions from the laws 
against insider trading.149  
Thomas Lambert proposes that corporations be allowed to opt out 
of insider trading laws, so long as insiders disclose their identities and 
the fact of their trading at the time of their trades.150  This arrangement 
would cause serious uncertainty whenever such an insider traded.151 
Insiders may trade not to exploit non-public information, but simply 
because they need cash or have extra cash that they want to invest.  
                                                                                                             
trading as a threat to stock market integrity and efficiency."). 
143See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 864 (discussing the issues surrounding the 
prospect of company-based contractual limitations on insider trading). 
144Id. at 863-64. 
145See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 35.  One reason for the change may be 
"the enhanced pressure from congressional legislation enacted in the 1980s."  Id.  See also J. 
C. Bettis, J. L. Coles & M.L. Lemmon, Corporate Policies Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57 
J. FIN. ECON. 191, 192 (2000) (arguing that even though research focuses on federal 
regulations, internal regulations are also widespread). 
146See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, § 2.3.2, at 35 (describing how passive 
companies were about employees using their respective positions for personal gain).   
147Corporations cannot impose fines or criminal penalties; only public law can do that.  
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS AND 
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 81, 94 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).  
A company prohibition on insider trading would also be difficult to draft and enforce, 
even if the firm were fully aware of the insiders' conduct.  The law of insider trading is 
complex with respect to issues like materiality and scienter.  See supra note 82.  It would be 
difficult for a firm to draft a policy covering all these issues. 
148See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 858-59, 894. 
149See id. at 864. 
150Thomas A. Lambert, Decision Theory and the Case for a Disclosure-Based Insider 
Trading Regime 14 (U. Mo. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-18, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2082521. 
151 Id. at 18.  
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Unable to determine the insider's reasons, outsiders and market makers 
could only guess and adjust the stock's price accordingly.152  
Insiders could counter erroneous inferences by denying that they 
were exploiting inside information.  When insiders who were using non-
public information traded, then, what would happen?153  If the market 
overreacted, could the insider withdraw her trading order?  An order 
would be executed, then, only if the market underreacted.  In that case, 
outsiders and market makers could protect themselves only by ceasing to 
trade until the insider either withdrew her order or disclosed the non-
public information.  In other words, the markets would temporarily cease 
to function.154   
Another problem with letting each company set its own rules is 
that the stock of any company refusing to impose an effective ban on 
insider trading would fall in value.155  Shareholders of such a company 
would have a legitimate complaint that they should not have to bear the 
resulting losses,156 particularly because the directors deciding to allow 
insider trading would be among the potential beneficiaries of that policy, 
making their decision self-interested.157  
More importantly, although individual companies could forbid 
insider trading, this would not be as effective as a public ban.  At the 
least, it would substitute thousands of company-specific rules against 
insider trading for the current uniform rule.  Recall that the primary 
supposed benefit of insider trading is its efficiency with regards to 
rewarding corporate innovators.158  To make the incentives effective 
requires a determination of which insiders were permitted to trade on 
each bit of inside information.159  One problem of implementation would 
 
                                                                                                             
152 Id. (stating that requiring trading reports could result in the filing of reports even 
when insiders are trading on the basis of nonpublic information). 
153Id. (proposing that to prevent such happenings, a "wolf crying" regulation be 
established). 
154Lambert, supra note 150, at 18-19. 
155See Mendelson, supra note 110, at 477-78; Persons, supra note 110, at 187; Wang, 
supra note 110, at 29-30.  
156Some commentators view inside information as property owned by the corporation.  
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 599, 604.  However, that property now belongs, in effect, to 
the shareholders, for whom the directors are fiduciaries.  It therefore seems inappropriate that 
the board approve a change in policy that would shift value from the shareholders to corporate 
insiders without compensation.  Of course, if a company announced that it permits insider 
trading before it went public, public investors would then be on notice and could not complain 
that they were being fleeced.  Id. at 605-06. 
157See Persons, supra note 110, at 189. 
158See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
159 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 599-600. 
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be that the determination would have to be made by corporate officials 
after the information was disclosed to them.160  This would entail, inter 
alia, substantial delay and the possibility of leakage of the information.161 
Furthermore, it is rare that an innovation can be ascribed entirely 
to one person.162  Sorting out who contributed to every innovation will 
usually be difficult, and often contentious.  "Victory has a hundred 
fathers, but defeat is an orphan."163  The company would have either to let 
all contributors trade or allot individual rations to each contributor.  The 
former approach raises the possibility that minor players would reap as 
much or more profit than the main innovators, which would severely 
erode the effectiveness of the program in rewarding innovation.164  In the 
latter approach, the resulting complexity and potential for resentment 
seem overwhelming.165  
A particularly important question becomes the insider trading 
rights of the directors themselves.  At least in theory, the board is the 
corporation's supreme governing body.166  Presumably, then, a good 
board adds corporate value.  If it does not, should the directors resign?  
On the other hand, recognizing that the board does not participate in 
operations, would employees resent the profits reaped by directors (who 
typically meet only one day per month) from knowledge generated by 
the employees?  There seems to be no satisfactory solution to this 
dilemma.  
The inevitable logistical difficulties of allocating insider trading 
rights also evidence the conceptual problem with using insider trading as 
compensation.  If a board can identify the contribution of each employee 
to an innovation, it can better reward that employee directly rather than 
through the allocation of insider trading rights.  One argument for insider 
trading is that "it allows a manager to alter his compensation package in 
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Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992). 
164 Manne conceded that many employees could trade on inside information without 
having contributed at all to any innovation.  MANNE, supra note 1, at 173. 
165Robert Haft envisions damage to firm morale as lower level employees "recognize 
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knowledge of corporate activities than the last."  Haft, supra note 37, at 1057.  The 
resentment would be even greater for those who felt that their contribution to innovation had 
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166See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2012) ("The business and affairs of 
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors."). 
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light of new knowledge, thereby avoiding continual renegotiation [of his 
incentive compensation package].  The manager, in effect, 'renegotiates' 
each time he trades."167  In other words, the argument for insider trading 
assumes that a board cannot apportion credit for innovation.168  
If that is true, though, the board also cannot make detailed 
allotments of insider trading rights.169  It can only permit insider trading 
by all employees, or by a designated class of "innovators."170  Under the 
former approach true innovators will try to hide their innovations from 
colleagues, so as to preserve the insider trading opportunities for 
themselves, thereby constricting the free flow of information needed for 
efficient operations.171  Nonetheless, it is virtually impossible to pursue 
an innovation without other employees learning about it, so inevitably, 
much of the insider trading profits will be reaped by others.172  
If instead a board limits insider trading to a designated group of 
"innovators," it will provoke tremendous resentment among excluded 
employees whose jobs have been tacitly labeled routine or ministerial, or 
not the kind of work that can add value.173  Those in the honored group, 
though, would be free to profit from inside information that has nothing 
to do with innovation, such as an unexpectedly good or bad earnings 
report.174  They would also be approved to reap insider trading profits 
even when they contributed nothing to an innovation.175  Thus, true 
innovators will still be motivated to hide their innovations.  
Equally important would be the provisions for enforcement of 
insider trading bans.  Violation of a company rule would not 
automatically give rise to shareholder standing to sue.  Because it is 
impossible, even in theory, to identify particular victims of insider 
trading,176 no shareholder could sue directly.  It is disputed whether 
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insider trading even damages the corporation.177  Operating under the 
assumption that it does, only the board can sue for injuries to the 
corporation, unless a majority of the directors are so personally interested 
in the matter that bringing a lawsuit would entail suing themselves.178  
Outsiders would be left to wonder how diligently the board would ferret 
out and prosecute inside traders. 
 Even a board trying to be diligent lacks the monitoring 
mechanisms capable of making a difference.179  Insiders can either hide 
their trading from management or refrain from trading personally but sell 
their information to tippees.180  The SEC and the exchanges can monitor 
the stock market for unusual trading.181  Even then, it is difficult to catch 
a clever inside trader.182  Without reliable monitoring devices, even a 
committed board might not be very effective.183  
It would, moreover, be understandable that a sophisticated board 
might not want to pursue or punish insider trading too vigorously.184  As 
soon as the board starts to proceed against one of its own officers, the 
trust between them, that is essential to effective governance, is broken.  
And that may be true not only for the executive(s) charged, but for all the 
company's officers, since management tends to view itself as a team, 
with interests somewhat separate from those of the board.  That 
possibility is not currently a problem because insider trading is illegal 
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and violations can be pursued by the SEC and individual investors; the 
board almost always stays hors de combat.185  If insider trading were 
legalized, the board could no longer rely on others to move against it.186  
In sum, it is hard to see how reliance on the market to deter and to 
sanction insider trading could be nearly as effective as the current 
(admittedly imperfect) system under federal law.187  At the least, a private 
system would leave considerable uncertainty in the trading public.  Even 
if a company were perceived to be essentially free of insider trading, 
substantial changes in management or in the composition of the board 
might raise questions about whether substantial insider trading might be 
in the offing.  Public investors would have to continuously monitor and 
price the risk of insider trading in each public company.  
Especially for smaller companies, the costs of such an effort would 
often exceed the potential returns, so that trading in and public ownership 
of these stocks would decline–perhaps to the point where the costs of 
public ownership would exceed the benefits for many companies.188  
These companies would then go private.  
Nonetheless, companies going public should be allowed to opt out 
of insider trading prohibitions if they disclose that policy.189  If investors 
are warned of the policy, they cannot later complain about it.190   
VI.  INSIDE INFORMATION AS CORPORATE PROPERTY 
Some commentators view insider trading in terms of property 
rights to information.191  Some would allocate that property right to 
managers.192  This would lead to all the problems with insider trading 
already discussed.  
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Stephen Bainbridge argues for assigning the property right to the 
corporation.193  This argument, however, raises the question: how can a 
corporation exploit that right, especially with respect to its own stock?194  
Bainbridge never addresses this question.195  If the corporation reassigns 
the right to managers, we have all the problems already discussed.196  
The corporation could instead trade for its own account.  However, 
the board of directors (which would have to authorize such trading) owes 
fiduciary duties to the shareholders, who would be on the other side of 
trades for the firm's own account.197  The law now does not currently 
permit this.198  "The issuer itself cannot trade on its own stock based on 
material nonpublic information."199  
It is hard to see why that rule should be changed.  The corporation 
itself is a legal fiction, not a real person; it has no interests apart from 
those of its constituents.200  In theory, the premier corporate 
constituents—those to whom fiduciary duties are owed—are the 
shareholders because only shareholders have the proper incentives to 
maximize efficiency.201  It would, then, be inconsistent with efficiency for 
a corporation to trade against its own shareholders for the benefit of 
some other constituency, such as its employees.  
Nor would it make economic sense for the firm to trade at the 
expense of shareholders trading the other way and for the benefit of non-
trading shareholders.202  First, the possibility of such trading creates an 
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irreconcilable tension with the corporation's public disclosure policies.203  
Corporations are urged not to give the minimum disclosures at the last 
possible moment required by law, but to give the fullest and earliest 
disclosure of information consistent with the strategic needs of the 
business for secrecy.204  A corporation trading for its own account, 
however, would have an incentive to disclose as little and as late as 
permitted by law, in order to maximize the opportunities for trading 
profits from insider information.  A general reduction and delay in the 
information disclosures by public companies would make securities 
markets less efficient.  
More important, trading by a corporation in its own stock for the 
benefit of one group of shareholders at the expense of another group 
violates the principle that the board should not discriminate among 
shareholders without good reason.205  Here, no such reason is evident.  
All shareholders bought their stock at some time (or received their stock 
gratuitously in a chain from someone who did buy), and all shareholders 
eventually dispose of their stock. Shareholders who trade often do so 
because of personal financial exigencies;206 they are not committing any 
wrong for which they deserve to be exploited by the companies in whose 
stock they trade.  
A rule of "caveat trader" would not benefit investors generally; it 
would only disadvantage investors who trade more than investors who 
trade less.  However, the efficiency of stock markets depends on a steady 
flow of trading.207  Insider trading by issuers would discourage trading, 
with resultant damage to the efficiency of stock markets208 but no 
offsetting benefits to investors.   
In sum, it would be a bad idea to treat inside information as 
property that belongs to the corporation, able to be exploited in trading 
for its own account.  
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
A persistent band of commentators continues to claim that insider 
trading is beneficial or, at least, so innocuous that it should be legal.  
However, these arguments all presume that the level of insider trading 
would remain low even if it were permitted, because it would be limited 
by the personal wealth of individual insiders.  This Note has shown that 
this assumption is unwarranted.   
If insider trading were legal, insiders could easily obtain outside 
financing to exploit their informational advantage, and they would have 
no reason not to do so.  This would drive the disadvantaged outsiders 
from the stock markets, thereby drastically reducing public ownership of 
corporations, which would also effectively end insider trading.  
Individual corporations lack the means and the incentives to curb insider 
trading on their own.  It would also be unwise to treat inside information 
as property belonging to the corporation that can be exploited in trading 
for its own account.  Corporations are supposed to operate for the benefit 
of their shareholders, not to fleece them for the benefit of some other 
constituency or some subset of shareholders.  Accordingly, there is no 
plausible argument for legalizing insider trading.   
  
